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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

rate was lower, not higher, than the one previously appended to the
verdict. But Judge Harnett in the instant case deemed Rachlin to be
authority for fragmenting the interest periods according to the effective date of the amendment, and thus applied the new CPLR 5004
prospectively. The court also relied on the presumption of prospective
construction 30 and on prior case law sustaining fragmentation of time
periods for interest purposes in other contexts. 31 The holding was
further supported by policy considerations, for, as correctly noted by
the court, "retroactive imposition of the six percent rate as a substitute
for the prior seven and one-half figure would bring a windfall to
the judgment debtor who has delayed satisfying his outstanding
32
obligations."'1
Although the amendment to CPLR 5004 is silent as to unsatisfied
judgments entered prior to its effective date, or as to actions accruing
theretofore, the Rachlin holding was seen as a barometer for future
First Department action. 33 It is hoped that the Yamamoto court's
utilization of this method of fragmenting time periods for interest
purposes will encourage other courts to follow the same approach when
confronted with this issue.
ARTICLE 52 -

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5236: Purchaseof judgment by professional collector for purposes of execution on realproperty held permissible.
By enacting CPLR 5286, the Legislature eliminated the equity of
redemption in execution sales, which was designed to ensure a fair
sale price 134 and to give the judgment debtor an opportunity to raise
130 73 Misc. 2d at 595, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 37, citing Mulligan v. Murphy, 14 N.Y.2d 223,
199 N.E.2d 496, 250 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1964); Graziano v. Donohue, 33 App. Div. 2d 578, 304
N.Y.S.2d 121 (3d Dep't 1969), aff'd mem., 25 N.Y.2d 955, 252 N.E.2d 852, 305 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1969).
13173 Misc. 2d at 595, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 37, citing City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement
Co., Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 24, 311 N.YS.2d 98 (4th Dep't 1970); Stull v. Joseph Feld, Inc.,
34 App. Div. 2d 655, 309 N.Y.S.2d 985 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.). See also O'Brien v. Young,
95 N.Y. 428 (1884); Rachlin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 370, 308 N.Y.S.2d 153
(1st Dep't 1970).
132 73 Misc. 2d at 596, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 38, citing Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank v. Sexton,
284 N.Y. 57,29 N.E.2d 469 (1940).
1335 WK&M
5004.01:
In the First Department it would seem that the determination in Rachlin would
prevail and interest will be computed at the various rates in effect during the
periods in which interest properly could be charged. In the remaining Departments the question of what are the applicable rates for periods prior to September
1, 1972 may yet have to be determined.
134 Paradoxically, the [redemption] provisions have probably had an exactly op-
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funds to pay his judgment. These purposes are now served by the provisions for notice of the sale to creditors (CPLR 5236(a)) and for an
eight week pre-sale waiting period (CPLR 5236(c)). 185 Further protection is afforded the judgment debtor by GPLR 5240136 which empowers
a court to make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating,
extending or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure.
Despite these safeguards, abuses have arisen out of the current
practice of assigning small judgments to professional collectors who
thereupon, "[b]y the use of technically valid legal steps, and the sale
for which CPLR 5236 provides, [sell] the debtor's home ...

at public

auction for but a fraction of its worth. The result is a serious miscarriage of justice. . . ,"137 In an effort to end this practice, courts in
Nassau County, where the abuse is widespread, have held that these
assignments violate section 489 of the Judiciary Law, which prohibits
the purchase of a claim by corporations or collection agencies for the
purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.13 8 These courts
posite effect. The right of redemption is rarely exercised because of the failure of
debtors and their judgment creditors to understand the complicated redemption
laws. But -uould-be execution sale purchasers are reluctant to bid at such sales
because of the threat of redemption.
Note, Execution PrioritiesBetween Real Estate and PersonalProperty in Illinois, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 548, 550-51 (1952), quoted in 6 WKcM 5236.02.
185 See 6 WK&M 5236.02.
186 In 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 153-55 (1972), Professor
Siegel interpreted CPLR 5240 as granting a court the power to delay an execution sale
to give a judgment debtor additional time to pay a judgment. This provision has been
used to protect judgment debtors and their families from the unnecessary sale of their
residences. See Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec. Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 363, 341 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1973) (mem.); Hammond v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc., 71
Misc. 2d 546, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.); Holmes v. W. T.
Grant, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 486, 336 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 580, 604 (1973); Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 46 ST.JOHN's L. Ruv. 355, 378 (1971).
137 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 153 (1972).
This practice has evolved because of the reluctance of reputable firms, department stores, and professional individuals who although they reduce a legitimate
obligation to judgment are unwilling to resort to a CPLR 5236 sale of real property because of the adverse publicity that may result.
Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 703, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583, 587 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 561, 578
(1972).
138 Bottenus v. Blackman, 71 Misc. 2d 583, 336 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 530, 600 (1973); Blackman
v. Pincus, 167 N.Y.L.J. 18, Jan. 26, 1972, at 15, col. 3 (App. T. 2d Dep't), rev'd sub nom.,
Concord Landscapers, Inc. v. Pincus, 41 App. Div. 2d 759, 341 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't

SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

1973]

found support for their decisions in the statute's language1 39 and un-

derlying policy considerations. 140
Unfortunately, in Concord Landscapers, Inc. v. Pincus,14 1 the

Appellate Division, Second Department, has ruled against this application of the statute. Reversing lower court orders enjoining the sale of
the debtor's home by a professional judgment collector, the Second
Department held that the enforcement procedures of CPLR article 52
are not "actions or proceedings"' 42 within the meaning of section 489
of the Judiciary Law. While noting the serious abuses involved in
CPLR 5236 sales, the court confined itself to an appeal to the Legislature for amendments to the relevant statutes.
Clearly an execution sale pursuant to CPLR 5236 should be considered a "proceeding" within the meaning of Judiciary Law section
489. The policy against the practice of law by corporations and professional collectors embodied in section 489143 is as applicable to the
elaborate CPLR 5236 procedure as it is to other "proceedings." Rather
than looking to the legislature for further statutory protections, New
York courts should apply the present provisions liberally to prevent
abuses.
1973) (mem.); cf. Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1971).
130 See Bottenus v. Blackman, 71 Misc. 2d 583, 336 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972) (holding that the word "proceedings" in judiciary Law section 489 encompasses the enforcement procedures in CPLR article 52). Affirming an order of the First
District Court of Nassau County, the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, reasoned that
since the section excepts from its operation the purchase or assignment of "judgments or other things in action" from certain enumerated estates "through court
actions, proceedings or otherwise," by necessary implication this proscribes the
acquisition of claims or judgments by individuals, corporations or collection
agencies in any other manner.
Blackman v. Pincus, 167 N.Y.L.J. 18, Jan. 26, 1972, at 15, col. 3 (App. T. 2d Dep't).
140 The considerations of using the attorney's edge are part of the statutory vice as
is the use of legal process to harass. The essential policy considerations of Section
489 apply fully to the case at bar.
Bottenus v. Blackman, 71 Misc. 2d 583, 587, 336 N.Y.S.2d 790, 795 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1972).
14141 App. Div. 2d 759, 341 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1973).
142 The first case to decide the issue appears to have been People v. Berlin, 65 Misc.
2d 245, 317 N.Y.S.2d 191, dismissed, 66 Misc. 2d 1034, 323 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Nassau County
Ct. 1971) (holding in the context of a criminal prosecution under Judiciary Law section
489 that the statute does not encompass enforcement proceedings initiated by professional
judgment collectors). Both the Berlin court and the Appellate Division in Concord relied
on early cases which held that the predecessor of Judiciary Law section 488 did not prohibit
an attorney from purchasing a judgment for the purpose of enforcing it. These early
interpretations of the predecessor of section 488, which spoke only of the bringing of
"actions," should not control the interpretation of section 489 which refers to "actions

or proceedings."
143 See Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 896, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).

